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called consequential.1 2 The water has physically invaded the prop-
erty and a "taking" has occurred.1 3 Shock waves flowing from a
government air base similarly invade neighboring property. It would
seem that where the invasion is so great that residential property
can no longer be used for that purpose, the property has been
"taken" just as effectively as if it were flooded. Where interference
stops short of entire deprivation of the normal use of the property,
it may be classified as consequential damage. 14 This is the proper
line of distinction between damage and a "taking."
The dissent in the Batten case, which argued that a distinction
between noise and shock waves traveling vertically and those travel-
ing horizontally was unreal, has been called the better view by
two state supreme courts.15 One of them,' at least, felt this would
be the position taken by the Supreme Court if it rules on the
question.
DONALD H. LEONARD
LANDLORD AND TENANT-OPTION TO PURCHASE PREMISES-ACTION
FOR DAMAGES WITHOUT TENDERING PERFORMANCE-The plaintiff
agreed to lease certain lands for three years with an option to pur-
chase at any time during the term. Eight months later the defendant-
lessor repudiated the lease, including the option, and requested the
plaintiff to vacate the premises. In an action for damages to recover
the difference between the option price and the fair market value
of the property, motion for judgment of involuntary nonsuit was
granted because until the plaintiff had exercised the option, there
could be no breach and therefore no recoverable damages. The
Supreme Court of Oregon, with two justices dissenting,' held that
a tender of the purchase price was not necessary because it would
require the plaintiff to make his election before the term he had
bargained for had lapsed. And despite the fact that the plaintiff might
not have exercised his option, the defendant, whose repudiation of
the option created this element of uncertainty, could not be relieved
of liability on the ground that the damages were speculative.
Fullington v. M. Penn Phillips Co., 395 P.2d 124 (Ore. 1964).
12. United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903) ; accord, Pumpelly v. G.B. & M. Canal
Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1891).
13. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947) ; United States v. Lynah, supra
note 12.
14. See Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914).
15. Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962) ; Martin V. Port
of Seattle, 391 P.2d 540 (Wash. 1964).
16. Martin v. Port of Seattle, supra note 15.
1. Goodwin, J. dissents on the ground that damages are too speculative. Repudiation
of the agreement did not terminate the option and the plaintiff still has the remainder
of the term in which to exercise it. Even if the optionor no longer had the power to per-
form (which is not the case) the better rule would require the optionee to exercise the
option before bringing an action for damages.
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This holding appears to be unprecedented in this country.
Recognized legal writers, however, in support of the proposition
have stated that the holder of an option to purchase may bring an
action for damages, without first having exercised the option, when
the optionor has repudiated or made performance impossible. 2 The
view expressed by these writers is supported by case law to this
extent: the optionee may recover damages without tendering the
purchase price when the optionor has rendered himself unable to
perform by selling the property to a third person without notice of
the option s or when, due to the optionor's breach, a substantial
portion of the subject matter of the option has ceased to exist.4
The theory of these cases is that the law will not require a vain or
useless act.
It seems then that there are two rules: first, the optionee may
recover damages without tendering performance of the option when
the optionor has rendered himself unable to perform.5 Second, as
illustrated by the instant case, the optionee has an action for damages,
without having tendered the purchase price, when the optionor has
merely repudiated the option even though there is no evidence that
performance has been frustrated or made impossible.
The majority opinion cites a number of condemnation cases
which it says, by analogy, support the holding that an optionee who
has not exercised his option to purchase can recover damages for
the optionor's repudiation of the lease-option agreement. While some
of these cases involve options to purchase realty,6 most of them
are concerned with options to renew or extend existing leasehold
interests. 7  It appears that a majority of the courts that have
2. 1A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 272 at 579 (1963). "During the agreed term of his op-
tion, he [the optionee] has a right that the option giver shall not repudiate or make per-
formance impossible or more difficult by conveying the land to a third person. These rights
are enforceable by all the usual judicial remedies, including judgment for damages, in-
junction, and decree for specific performance." (Emphasis supplied). JAMES, OPTION CON-
TRACTS § 1104 at 504 (1916). "The optionor expressly or impliedly stipulates not to with-
draw the offer of sale during the time limit, and, therefore, if during the time limit he
breaches the option agreement by repudiating the option, or by placing himself in a posi-
tion where it is impossible for him to perform, it would seem the optionee has an action
to recover damages arising from breach of the option, although he has not elected." (Em-
phasis supplied).
3. Pearson v. Horne, 139 Ga. 453, 77 S.E. 387 (1913).
4. In McFerran v. Heroux, 44 Wash. 2d 631, 269 P.2d 815 (1954), the defendant owned
a grandstand situated upon land owned by the plaintiff. In consideration of a ten year
lease of the premises to the defendant, the plaintiff received an option to Purchase the
grandstand at the end of the term for a relatively nominal price. As a part of the lease
option agreement, the defendant convenanted that should the grandstand be destroyed by
fire he would either rebuild the grandstand or surrender the lease to the plaintiff. The
grandstand was destroyed by fire and the defendant elected to rebuild. When a new
grandstand, which was not substantially the same as the one destroyed had been erected,
the plaintiff, without tendering performance, brought an action for damages to recover
the value of his option. The court held that the defendant's failure to rebuild the grand-
stand in substantially the same form deprived the plaintiff of his option to purchase and
that- the legal effect was no different than if the defendant had sold the property to a
third person. As a result of the defendant's breach the subject matter of the option no
longer existed. It would be useless to require the plaintiff to allege that, but for the
breach, he would have been willing to exercise the option.
5. Supra notes 3 & 4.
6. Nicholson v. Weaver, 194 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1952); Dreler v. Kaw Valley Drain-
age Dist., 117 Kan. 402, 232 Pac. 600 (1925) ; Cullen & Vaughn Co. v. Bender Co., 122
Ohio St. 82, 170 N.E. 633 (1930).
7. United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946) ; United States v. 425, 031
Square Feet of Land, 187 F.2d 798 (3d Cir. 1951); Brooklyn Eastern Dist. Terminal v.
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considered the question have held that the holder of an option to
purchase, which is unexercised at the time of taking, is not entitled
to a portion of the condemnation award." Conversely, the prevailing
view among the courts that have ruled on the issue regarding options
to renew a lease have allowed the option holder to recover damages
for the value of his option.9 Some cases have drawn the distinction
that a renewal option creates an interest in land, while a purchase
option is a mere contract right.10 In view of these authorities it
is questionable how much support, if any, they lend to the principal
case. Even the cases" which have allowed damages to the holder
of an option to purchase would seem to afford more support for the
rule that tender of performance is excused only when the optionor
has rendered himself unable to perform. 2
There is considerable authority for the dissenting justices' view
that repudiation of the lease does not necessarily terminate the
option. It is generally held that the option is not terminated if the
lease and option can be considered separate and independent agree-
ments;18 but, if they constitute one entire agreement, the unexercised
option is automatically extinguished upon termination of the lease. 14
When the lease and option are inseparable the doctrine of relief
against forfeitures may, under certain circumstances, prevent the
option from being terminated with the lease.'5  On these bases the
option holder may still have had the right to exercise the option
even if the repudiation did terminate the lease.
The author concludes that the recovery of damages, in instances
where the option has not been exercised, should be restricted to
cases where it is no longer within the power of the optionor to
perform. This gives the optionee only what he bargained for-the
right to purchase the property at any time during the term. "He did
City of New York, 139 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1944) ; State ex rel. Morrison v. Carlson, 83
Ariz. 363, 321 P.2d 1025 (1958) ; Department of Pub. Works and Bldgs. v. Bohne, 415 Ill.
253, 113 N.E.2d 319 (1953) ; Hercy v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 99 N.J. Eq. 525, 133
Ati. 872 (1926).
8. E.g., City of Ashland v. Kittle, 347 S.W.2d 522 (Ky. 1961) ; State v. New Jersey
Zinc Co., 40 N.J. 560, 193 A.2d 244 (1963) ; See Annot., 85 A.L.R.2d 588 (1962).
9. State ex rel. Morrison v. Carlson, supra note 7.
10. E.g., City of Ashland v. Kittle, supra note 8; Cornell-Andrews Smelting Co. v.
Boston & P. R.R., 209 Mass. 298, 95 N.E. 887 (1911). Many other cases are in accord with
the interest in land theory. See e.g., People v. Ocean Shore R.R., 90 Cal. App. 2d 464, 203
P.2d 579 (1949) ; Anderson v. Blixt, 72 N.W.2d 799 (N.D. 1955). In Gulf Interstate Gas
Co. v. Garvin, 368 S.W.2d 309 (Ky. 1963) the court, after distinguishing the Kittle case
and refusing to recognize the interest in land view, presented this test: If at the time of
condemnation there are any rights outstanding, enforceable against the owner of the fee,
and if these rights reduce the market value of the property, the holders of the rights are
entitled to compensation for their loss or Impairment. Thus it is immaterial whether
such rights constitute an interest in land.
11. Cases cited note 6 supra.
12. See Goodman v. Yawkey, 101 F. Supp. 769 (D.C. Mass. 1952), afj'd sub nom. on
condition, Brooks v. Yawkey, 200 F.2d 663 (1st Cir. 1953) where the court held that the
rights of a holder of an option to purchase were terminated by the taking of the property
in condemnation since it was impossible for the optionor to perform thereafter.
13. E.g., Mathews Slate Co. v. New Empire Slate Co., 122 Fed. 972 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1903);
Holmes v. Harris, 33 N.J. Super. 395, 110 A.2d 329 (1954) ; Warner-Quinlon Co. v. Smith,
134 Misc. 649, 236 N.Y. Supp. 241 (1929), aff'd without opinion 229 App. Div. 814, 242
N.Y Supp. 762 (1930), aff'd without opinion 255 N.Y. 582, 175 N.E. 322 (1930).
14. E.g., Mooney v. Weaver, 262 Ala. 392, 79 So. 2d 3 (1955); Estfan v. Hawks, 166
Kan. 712, 204 P.2d 780 (1949) ; Simon v. Schabo, 117 N.W.2d 412 (N.D. 1962).
15. See Thompson v. Coe, 96 Conn. 644, 115 AUt. 219 (1921).
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not buy the right to sue for damages"' 16 and should be precluded
from doing so without exercising his right. Until such time, he has
lost nothing.
JOHN L. SHERMAN
16. Fulllngton v. M. Penn Phillips Co., 395 P.2d 124, 127 (Ore. 1964) (dissenting
opinion).
